To the Editor:
Re “Trump Commutes Stone’s Sentence on Seven Felonies” (front page, July 11):
I think the commutation of Roger Stone’s prison sentence has less to do with what he will say in support of the Trump candidacy in 2020, and more with what he won’t say about the Trump candidacy in 2016.
I suspect that Mr. Stone made it known that if no commutation was forthcoming and he had to report to prison, he would begin talking, to anyone who would give him a forum, about the things he knows about President Trump and his family.
Should we expect anything else from this self-professed “dirty trickster”? He would have always held something in reserve for his own protection.
Mr. Trump didn’t do a favor for Mr. Stone; he did a favor for himself, as always.
Kevin Kelleher
Bethlehem, Pa.
To the Editor:
Every expert — left, right and center — appears to agree that the president’s power to grant reprieves and pardons is absolute and unlimited. The argument usually invokes the plain text of the Constitution, though it’s really based on what the Constitution does not say — namely, it does not explicitly qualify this power in any way.
But the Constitution is filled with unqualified provisions, yet we have well over 200 years of judicial interpretation whose purpose is precisely to qualify those provisions. For example, the Constitution says that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, and it offers not one single word to limit that provision. But what is the history of First Amendment jurisprudence other than the pursuit of appropriate limitations, usually to reconcile that part of the Constitution with other parts or with common law understandings?
So why should the president’s power to reprieve or pardon be any different? Does the Constitution really give the president the power to reprieve or pardon for plainly corrupt purposes? How would such a power be reconciled with, say, the constitutional requirement that the president take an oath to “faithfully execute” the law?
Peter J. Steinberger
Portland, Ore.
The writer is a professor of political science and humanities at Reed College.
To the Editor:
As a lawyer, I am lost in admiration for the novel jurisprudence taught us by the Trump administration in explaining the commutation of Roger Stone’s sentence. In essence, it announces that witnesses who lie to an investigator seeking to determine whether a suspect has committed a criminal offense are liable only if the investigator concludes that such an offense has in fact been committed.
The new doctrine is almost poetic in its beauty and simplicity, especially in cases where the witnesses are committed to shielding the suspect. The suspect is not held accountable because the witnesses lied. The witnesses are not held accountable because the suspect escaped accountability.
What a breath of fresh air for a profession so burdened by complexities, ambiguities and nuances!
Alma Suzin Flesch
New York