This was evident with the disquiet in the West over Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia, particularly at a time when the Nato summit was underway. But India had its own reasons to press ahead. Russian oil and fertiliser supplies are crucial to prevent increasing food inflation from spiralling out of control.
Also, Moscow remains New Delhi’s main defence supplier. In the tight security situation India finds itself on its northern borders, serviceability of existing equipment is of vital concern. Russia’s prioritisation of resources towards the Ukraine war has also started to impact delivery timelines on the nuclear energy front. A significant addition to this year’s joint statement was a specific line on Kudankulam that both sides ‘agreed on adhering to the schedule, including to the timelines for delivery of supplies’.
The Biden administration, which has so far adjusted to India’s special situation with Russia, feels differently on this occasion. This dovetails with the larger effort within Nato to ‘Trump-proof’ the alliance, especially in its support to Ukraine’s war effort. Already, US lawmakers have, through an amendment in the National Defence Authorisation Act 2024, included a stipulation that the US president will need two-third approval of the senate to withdraw from Nato, essentially aimed at curbing a future Trump presidency from unilaterally withdrawing from the alliance.
The Nato summit in Washington last week also took note that 23 of its 32 members were now spending the target 2% GDP on defence. This means the Nato burden is better shared, providing a healthy cushion in case Trump gets to office and tables other plans. That said, the US is Nato’s fulcrum, and no amount of foolproofing can keep the alliance going without Washington at the heart of the mix. Yet, the current political endeavour seems focused on pre-empting a shock decision by introducing as many encumbrances as possible to delay the process.
Russia and China have drawn closer to the extent that at G7 and Nato summits, the West called out China, Iran and North Korea for supporting the Russian war effort. So, the emergence of two camps is becoming clearer on not just the political front but also in various global financial, technological and arms regimes that have governed transactions so far. These institutions not only stand divided but also risk drifting apart.In this backdrop, what Trump may bring to the table is still unclear. On the one side, there is centrist, institutional Europe preparing for exigencies in case there’s change in the White House. But there’s also strengthening of the extreme Right in Italy, the Netherlands, France and Germany. Then there’s pro-Russian Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, who, while attending the Nato summit, met Trump separately in Florida on a ‘peace mission’. His meeting with Trump follows visits to Kyiv, Moscow and Beijing.Orban also reached an understanding with the Nato secretary general for an ‘opt-out’ from the decision to deepen support to Ukraine, on the condition that Hungary will not block efforts by the rest of the alliance. He’s also against Nato’s anti-China positioning, and his closest ally in Europe is Slovakian PM Robert Fico, who incidentally also survived an assassination attempt two months ago.
Clearly, the global divide is playing into the American political divide. The troublesome question is China. It was during Trump 1.0 that the hardline on Beijing was first drawn. This was one policy Biden took forward. Will a possible Trump 2.0 be a continuation of his first term? There’s no certainty to that. In fact, the working assumption is to prepare for the unexpected.
India is in a unique position. It has an adversarial security situation with China, but close links with Russia and Iran. Nevertheless, the US is India’s most important strategic partner today, vital to counter China at a time when traditional partner Moscow is economically dependent on Beijing. New Delhi’s future tech and economic partnerships are also being planned with the West underlined by a common security understanding of the Indo-Pacific.
Within the US, India’s bipartisan support base has helped it carve out exceptions from both Republican and Democrat administrations. If immigration was an issue in Trump 1.0, then economic contribution of the Indian immigrant community made a case for uniquity. Despite pressure, a meeting ground was possible on climate change with Biden. Both administrations accommodated India’s relationship with Russia, while allowing access to high-end US technology when needed.
But the playbook has gotten riskier to execute now. Expectations from India are growing from opposing camps while the margin for accommodation seems to be shrinking. The assassination bid on Trump is one such moment that could make straddling the middle ground difficult.
But while most nations are foolproofing and strengthening their defences, India’s approach will require creating options within and outside the US. Creativity, dexterity and nimbleness in this play will determine if India emerges net gainer at the finishing line.
pranabdhal.samanta@timesofindia.com